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The Military and ''Mob Rule''
The CEF Riots in Calgary, February 1916
P. Whitney Lackenbauer
uring the First World War, unruly and illdisciplined Canadian soldiers, on "assorted
'patriotic' pretexts," damaged local property and
battled with local police forces in Victoria,
Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Campbellton, New
Brunswick, and other Canadian centres. 1 The
riots in Calgary in February 1916 involved
members of Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF)
battalions encamped near the city. While
historians have focussed on the anti-German
nature of the attacks, several other
considerations must be examined to explain the
unlawful behaviour. Although a court of inquiry
into the riot failed to conclude who was
responsible, the contemporary evidence suggests
strongly that soldiers, rather than civilians,
started the disturbances. But what conditions
allowed such behaviour to occur? The military
context of the time offers insight. Recruitment,
training and discipline were all factors, as was
the nearness of the soldiers' camp to Calgary.
The military, however, denied responsibility,
arguing that the culprits were "civilians" in
uniform. By refusing to compensate the owners
of local establishments for the damages caused
during the riots, local and national military
authorities made worse a problem they should
have prevented.

D

When the First World War broke out in August
1914, Canada was ill-prepared for war. Sam
Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence,
believed firmly that the virtues of the 'citizen
soldier' were superior to those of his professional
counterparts. In Hughes's vision, the permanent
force existed merely to train the militia; the real
Canadian fighting spirit was in the broad
populous who had rallied to the cause in 1812
and had (in the popular consciousness at least)
thwarted American Manifest Destiny. Rather than
abide by pre-war mobilization plans created by

permanent force officers, Colonel Hughes decided
to adopt his own. Through a series of night
telegrams, Hughes invited newly-formed,
numbered battalions to an uncompleted military
camp at Valcartier, near Quebec City. 2
Of the first contingent of soldiers at Valcartier,
one third hailed from west of Ontario, a
proportion that far exceeded the west's
population. Sam Hughes first pushed aside
suggestions that centrally located depots were
needed to gather and train unbrigaded recruits.
But as the war progressed, officials decided that
the majority of units raised in Western Canada
would receive preliminary training in their
military district of origin and then proceed
directly to England. 3
In Alberta, there was a dire need for a
mobilization camp. As the headquarters of
Military District No.13, Calgary was a natural
focal point for such a concentration, and by 1915,
new recruits began to gather in the city.
Unfortunately, as Ottawa authorized Alberta's
militia units to recruit to war strength, Calgary
had no barracks, and virtually no uniforms or
equipment. The shortages became even more
acute when, in late 1915, Sam Hughes authorized
the 56th, 82nd and 89th Infantry Battalions to
recruit from the Calgary area. 4 A large military
camp teeming with young men pleased local
business owners, especially hotel owners
(prohibition was not introduced until1918), and
the city prospered early in the war.
Brigadier-General Ernest A. Cruikshank was
the commander of the Alberta district.
Cruikshank had joined the militia as an ensign
in 1877, rising in rank to become a lieutenantcolonel in the militia. In 1909, he transferred to
the permanent force and was appointed to
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bars. Many recruits were
command the district. He
getting restless and anxious
soon developed a reputation
as an able administrator, one
to get overseas!" 10
"with scrupulous regard for
This volatile mix was
the public purse" who strove
further
stirred up by other
for "economy and efficiency
influences
circulating within
when extravagance and
the community. As the dream
waste were palliated in other
of a short war died, so did
districts." 5 When Sir John
tolerance for ethnic groups
French, the Inspector
associated with the enemy.
General of the Imperial
Across the country, as
Service, inspected the
macabre tales of German
Calgary camp in 1911 he
atrocities began to circulate,
deemed Cruikshank a "most
anti-German hysteria swept
conscientious, zealous,
through Anglo-Canadian
reliable and intelligent
society. The rhetoric helped
officer, with strong common
transform the war: instead of
sense. "6 The Chief of the
participating
out
of
Canadian General Staff,
obligation to Britain,
Major-General
Colin
«: Canadians began to view the
Mackenzie, was even more
:;;; war as a defence of
laudatory the following year.
-~ civilization itself.'' In midHe concluded: "[Cruikshank]
~ January 1916, Senator
has an intimate knowledge of
~James A. Lougheed of
the character and military
,.8 Calgary fed the paranoia,
aptitude of officers serving in
.3] arguing before the Senate
his Command. He might be
0
that Germany's designs for
relied on to do well on
"world
power"
and
service. •>? Cruikshank also
"territorial
conquest"
had a reputation of being
Brigadier-General Ernest A. Cruikshank,
strict when dealing with his commander oj the Alberta militia district, extended to the Western
officers, a trait he had was the officer in command during the hemisphere and Canada
itself. "Germany, through its
displayed during his militia 1916 riots.
system of espionage, has a
days and carried with him to
more thorough knowledge of Canada in the
the regular force. Rather than distancing him
pigeon-holes of its foreign office than would be
from his officers it appeared to earn him the
found in the departments of our own
respect, even affection, of his subordinates. 8
Government," Lougheed proclaimed, and "the
By the cold winter of 1916, soldiers on the
greatest menace to Canada from this war lies in
streets of Calgary were commonplace. Over the
this situation." 12 Conspiracy-minded Canadians
winter, the trainees were billeted in barracks at
blamed the burning of the Parliament Buildings
the old Victoria Park or in the newly-converted
in February 1916 on Germans, compounding
Price Jones and Calgary Furniture Company
existing tensions. In Calgary, home to the largest
buildings in Calgary. The temperatures forced
German population of any city or town in Alberta
most of the training indoors; only platoon and
(2,608 in 1911), came strong demands to
parade drill and the occasional route marches
terminate the employment of Germans, revoke
broke the monotony. 9 So did the search for new
the voting rights of "enemy aliens" and intern
recruits. Soldier Harvey Daniel Duncan described
Germans and Austrians. 13
the situation in Calgary in early 1916: "On Eighth
Within this context, soldiers stationed at
Avenue and over the country, recruiting offices
barracks in Calgary decided to take matters in
were operating at full strength. White feathers
their own hands. Rumours were circulating that
were being handed out to eligible bachelors!
the White Lunch Company had fired returned
Young recruits swaggered around the streets and
soldiers and employed enemy aliens in their
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In this staged photograph, Calgary firemen attack effigies oj German soldiers.

places. A handwritten sign reiterating this belief
was posted in the camp canteen for all to read:
"Keep away from the 'White Lunch.' They fired
two British waiters and engaged one German and
one Austrian in their places .. 14 On the afternoon
of 10 February 1916, F.H. Naegel, the manager
of the White Lunch on 8th Avenue, called the
General Officer Commanding (GOC) and wamed
him of rumours that there might be trouble.
Brigadier Cruikshank did not act on the
warnings, later claiming that he could not do
anything unless Naegel put a request in writing
(which the latter did not do). Unfortunately, as
events unfolded, the White Lunch manager's
foreboding proved to be well founded.
At about 8:00pm, four soldiers walked into
the White Lunch Restaurant at 128 8th Avenue
East. They stood around the checkout counter,
where a woman at the counter overheard their
conversation; when they departed she informed
the manager that there was going to be trouble.
A group of soldiers soon headed steadily
eastward on the south side of 8th Ave. towards
the restaurant. By the time it reached the
restaurant, the crowd numbered several hundred
soldiers. In front of the establishment, a soldier
gave the order for the men to halt, and they tumed
in formation to face the White Lunch. They then
rushed across the street. The Calgary Chief of

Police first heard of the raid at 8:15 pm. He
gathered up about 15 men to try and counter
what appeared to be ominous developments. 15
An Ottawa newspaper painted a vivid picture of
what transpired:
Chief of Police Cuddy, half a dozen constables
and plainclothesmen hurried to the place. All
customers were sent out and the doors locked.
When the soldiers arrived the chief asked them
to disperse and not to behave in an unlawful
manner. He was disregarded, and as a
preliminary a shower of missiles went crashing
through the big plate glass windows [and made
an entrance through this route]. A woman
cashier, trying to save some plants, was slightly
hurt, and Police Constable Fraser so badly cut
by flying glass that he had to go to the hospital.
The policemen were swept aside like chips in a
gale and for an hour the mob did its will with
the place. The crowd was increased to two
thousand and the officers were helpless. The
furniture fixtures and cooking apparatus were
smashed to fragments. Marble counters and
stands looked as though artillery shells had
exploded. A cash register was ripped open and
looted. Coffee urns and gas stoves were tom from
their places. Electric fixtures were pulled down.
The street outside was littered with wreckage.
The safe was thrown downstairs into the
basement, breaking the stairs. 16

While the soldiers attacked the restaurant, a
crowd of several thousand looked on. What
33
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Pre-riot photos of the White Lunch Restaurant.

fragments of furniture remained were thrown
onto the street and reduced to even smaller pieces
by the crowd.
Once finished with the restaurant, the rioters
smashed down the door leading upstairs to the
dance academy on the second floor. The
proprietor of the academy was teaching a number
of soldiers how to dance at the time the crowd
arrived at the building, and had even hung a Red
Ensign outside of his window prior to the raid
"to show the boys that they were British in the
Dance Hall." Nevertheless, the frenzied mob went
to work. The windows were "burst out," the
furniture (including the piano) was broken and
hurled onto the street, and the flags and
decorations on the walls were reduced to ribbons.
In a feat of particular daring, the flag outside the
dance academy was pulled down, and the electric

Glenbow Archives NA -1469-4~

sign that projected the restaurant's name over
the sidewalk crashed to the ground. 17
The authorities seemed powerless to
intervene. During the riot, Mr. Naegel from the
White Lunch fled to the central fire station but
was rebuffed by the fire department when he
sought their assistance. As it turned out, the
dense crowd kept the fire-fighting equipment
from getting to the restaurant. Like the police,
the firemen could only join the spectators. 18 Police
chief Cuddy took did not order his men to use
force against the mob as he "recognized at once
that such action would only tend to antagonize
the soldiers, and might possibly have resulted
in murder." Although a few drunken soldiers tried
to assault the police, chief Cuddy doubted that
"a military guard, much less a handful of
policemen, would have saved the object of their

Post-riot photo of the White Lunch Restaurant.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss1/4

4

Lackenbauer: The Military and “Mob Rule”: The CEF Riots in Calgary, February 1

to the story, treating readers
to photos of the damage done
to each of the restaurants, but
also headlining with the
reassurance that the police
had names of the "riot
Concurrent to the
ringleaders." The newspaper
expressed little sympathy for
attack on the 8th Avenue
building, a "second
\9 the rioters, stressed that the
division" of soldiers had
~ attack should never have
r.
~ occurred, and called for both
converged on the other
White Lunch location at
military and civilian inquiries
~
528 19th Avenue, some six
:o into
the
"disgraceful
:2
blocks southwest of the
2 proceedings." An editorial
first riot. Urged on by
~ dismissed the alleged causes
civilians and with no police
.8 for the attack as "insufficient
to oppose them, the mob
.§ to have warranted such
destroyed the restaurant in
lawless" behaviour, and ruled
one rush. The waiters and
that "such conduct as the men
cashiers fled immediately,
of the Calgary garrison
and the soldiers went to
indulged in last evening might
work in earnest. Daring
suit Hun tastes, but it is
exploits were
later
entirely foreign to the British
recounted with pride:
Alfred Cuddy
principle." It suggested that
soldiers had hung from the
Calgary Chief of Police
other Calgary institutions
chandeliers, pleasing the destructive crowd with
were threatened, but emphasized that Calgarians
acrobatic stunts. The Calgary Albertan noted that
could not afford to tolerate mob law under any
within a few minutes, the place "looked as though
circumstances. 22
it were situated 'somewhere in Ypres,' and that a
On ll February, Brigadier Cruikshank
howitzer shell had exploded." 20
addressed all of the units under his command
With police unable to restore order, the
at their various quarters, condemning the
military scrambled to control the situation.
conduct of the perpetrators the night before and
Brigadier Cruikshank heard of the riots just after
pointing to the penalties such outrages
9:00pm. The Chief Constable told him that he
warranted. He also held a meeting of the various
could not control the crowd, so Cruikshank
units' commanding officers, the Mayor, the City
proceeded to 8th Avenue to address the excited
Solicitor and the Chief Constable of Calgary. The
throng. The commanding officer ordered the
officers issued a unanimous opinion that there
soldiers to return to their quarters and they
was no danger of further disorder, which seemed
quickly complied. Unarmed picquets were
to satisfy the civic officials. As a precautionary
established and there were no further signs of
measure, the commanding officers were ordered
disorder. 21 By midnight all was quiet again, but
to double the strength of their picquets. In
the gaping fronts of the wrecked buildings and
addition, several local businesses informed the
the littered debris of smashed furniture and
GOC that they had received threats to their
fittings on the street bore witness to the night's
buildings if they did not discharge all enemy alien
destruction.
employees. Cruikshank made sure each of the
unit commanders were aware of these potential
The local and national press immediately
flash points. 23
responded to these sensational events. The next
day, the Morning Albertan highlighted the
The officers wildly missed the mark with their
soldiers' disobedience to the will of police and
optimistic estimate that no more riots were
superior officers, and the inability of the
forthcoming. The following evening, "trouble
authorities to cope with the excited crowd. The
came like a bomb from the blue heavens, sudden,
Calgary Herald devoted most of its front page
demoralizing, appalling. "24 Between 8 and 9 pm,

attack." 19 With no police
resolve to risk active
intervention, the 8th
Avenue site was utterly
destroyed.

j
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The bar area oj the Riverside Hotel following its destruction by the mob.

a group of 500 soldiers and civilians proceeded
across the Langevin Bridge to the Riverside Hotel
in the predominantly German-speaking
Riverside-Bridgeland area of the city. This time,
rumour had it that the English owner of the
Riverside Hotel was actually a German and had
hosted a meeting of pro-German sympathizers
to celebrate the burning of the Canadian
Parliament in Ottawa. Whatever justification the
crowd conjured up, hundreds of soldiers
gathered in front of the Alberta Hotel and shouted
and yelled to the interest of pedestrians as they
marched eastward along 8th Avenue. The mob
absorbed soldiers and civilians as it moved along,
numbering at least a thousand by the time it
reached the corner of 4th Street East. Brigadier
Cruikshank had hastily arranged picquets and
the commanding officers of the local battalions
marched to the scene of the rioting as soon as
word of the mob was received. Each officer tried
to form a guard with men picked from the crowd,
but it was too late. The mob, estimated later at
over 1500, overwhelmed the meagre defences,
moved into the building, and "for two hours a
veritable reign of terror prevailed. "25 The soldiers'
appetite for excitement, still whetted by the
adrenaline rush from the night before, was not
yet satisfied. The rioters first destroyed the bar,
and with their spirits lifted by stolen alcohol they
began to destroy the entire property. Alfred Henry
Ebsworth, the owner of the Riverside, took stock
of the damage afterwards:

... every room in the house had been visited
and ... the interior of the hotel was a complete
wreck. The bar fixtures, counters, electric light
fixtures and all other property was either
smashed up and destroyed or removed ...
considerable damage was done to the building
itself, the stairway was pulled down and
demolished completely, the radiators in the
rooms were twisted and torn from their
bearings, the keystone over the arch of the main
entrance was knocked out, permitting the
building to settle and disclosing large cracks in
the brickwork ... .Iron beds are broken, twisted
and warped so that many of them would be
absolutely beyond repairs, the mirrors, dressing
cases, chairs and bureaus are all broken, many
of them in cases pitched through the windows,
the curtains are tom down and the carpets and
rugs damaged completely through liquor, water
and other refuse brought upon the premises.~ 6

Little was left of the 48-room hotel when the mob
had finished. Satisfied that its work was done at
the hotel, the mob went back over the turn and
moved uptown. 27
Subsequent activity suggested that strong
picquets were, in fact, reliable means of
dissuading soldiers from riotous acts. Rumours
abounded that Kolb's restaurant and Cronn's
Rathskeller were targeted for the next attacks,
but the mob (its ranks now swelled by civilian
men and women "out for the sake of the
sensation") was forestalled by "khaki-clad lines"
barring their way. Some 700 soldiers on piquet
duty simply lined up in front of these buildings

36
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and there was no attempt to "rush" them. The
Palliser Hotel, a brewery, and the office of the
Canadian Bible Society (that had circulated
German bibles) were also threatened but military
guards discouraged any action. By midnight the
cold, tired crowds, bored by the lack of action,
dispersed. According to the owner of the
Riverside Hotel. this "clearly demonstrat[ed] that
a firm stand was all that was necessary to put a
stop to the rioting at any stage." 28
The riots continued to generate attention in
weeks ahead. The military authorities were, of
course, preoccupied with maintaining order.
Brigadier Cruikshank sent off a hasty telegram
to the Militia Council in Ottawa stating that the
restaurants and hotel had been "wrecked by [a]
band of soldiers and others" and that every effort
was being made to keep order in the face of
widespread "anti-German excitement." To
prevent a reoccurrence, Cruikshank placed all
of the hotel bars out of bounds, any soldier on
the street without a pass was liable for arrest.
and troops were held in readiness "to repress
disorder." Each battalion was allotted a segment
of the city and a roll call was held every hour to
ensure that the soldiers were present and
accounted for. 29 According to a local informant,
other businesses continued to be "seriously
menaced but no damage [was] done" on account
of "strong armed pickets [sic]" that were
established around the city. 30 Terrified local
German-speaking residents, most of whom
originated from Russia and were not German
nationals, barricaded themselves into their
homes.
The streets were quiet, but the rhetoric and
pressure for government action continued to
mount. While condemning the rioters for creating
an incident that could be used to justify "gross
cruelty to Canadian prisoners," the Albertan
lobbied for the internment of all enemy aliens,
"not merely because of the violent outbursts of
some Calgary soldiers" but because it was the
most "human and charitable" thing to doY
City Council was caught in the hail of
controversy over the riots and the apparent threat
to social stability in Calgary. On the morning of
Saturday, 12 February, Council held a special
meeting attended by Brigadier Cruikshank. He
assured the City that he would maintain control
of the military in the City without imposing

martial law. Council passed a resolution
expressing their confidence in the military
authorities. Furthermore, Council authorized the
Mayor "to do all acts necessary to effectively cooperate with the Military authorities to maintain
order." If further trouble arose, and civilians
interfered, Cruikshank said he would call on the
magistrate to ask them to disperse. The mayor,
for his part, appealed to Calgarians to stay off
the street and asked Alberta's premier, A.L.
Sifton, to close all the bars and liquor stores until
further notice.
To quell the anti-German hysteria, Council
immediately dismissed all civic employees of
alien nationality and laid off all street railway
company employees born in enemy countries.
Finally, to curtail more lawless behaviour by
soldiers, a rider was added to the motion stating
that returned soldiers be employed where
possible in the places of the discharged. Calgary's
mayor also urged the federal government to
intern all enemy aliens in Canada, whether
naturalized or not. 32 These resolutions, coupled
with media and public sentiment that condemned
the unruly and destructive behaviour but upheld
the explicit motivations of the rioters, meant that
the soldiers had indeed achieved some of their
substantial objectives.
Military authorities in Ottawa were troubled
by the disruptions caused by soldiers acting
without consent and against the orders of their
officers. The Governor-General, His Royal
Highness the Duke of Connaught, was appalled
by the "disgraceful behaviour of the troops at
Calgary" as it showed "great lack of tact on the
part of the officers and want of discipline on the
part of the men." He wanted to know what the
local military authorities were doing about it. 33
In the House of Commons on 14 February,
opposition leader Sir Wilfrid Laurier questioned
the prime minister about the Calgary
disturbances and asked what steps the
Government had done to control enlisted men
"in places where liquor runs freely." Sir Robert
Borden denied any indication that liquor was
involved, but a telegram from Brigadier
Cruikshank confirmed Laurier's information the
following day:
Attacks on restaurants and hotel undoubtedly
led by some soldiers mainly under influence of
liquor. Civilians participated in second attack
apparently inflamed by reports of meetings of
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enemy aliens and that employees had been
discharged to give place for aliens. These attacks
now being investigated by court of enquiry.
Several arrests have been made and these men
handed over to civilian authorities."•

The prime minister reported back to Parliament
that an inquiry was being made and that an
official report would be received in due course.
He was, nevertheless, "sure that the reports"
received on the Calgary incidents had "been very
greatly exaggerated. "35
Only after the Riverside Hotel riot did
Cruikshank finally put tangible measures in place
to prevent another recurrence. Returning from
City Hall on 12 February, Cruikshank informed
the commanding officers that they would be
responsible for "good order and discipline" within
their units and around the city. For the next four
days these instructions remained in force, and
the local battalions were sent on long marches
in the country to walk off ""a whole lot of
effervescent animal spirits. ":16
The GOC established a court of inquiry to
investigate the attacks on the White Lunch
restaurants on ll February, the day after the
initial riot. The court was assembled at district
headquarters, along with concurrent but separate
proceedings to inquire into the attack on the
Riverside Hotel. The court met daily until 24
February. Seventy-three witnesses, including the
Calgary Chief of Police, police detectives, several
military officers and non-commissioned officers
(NCOs), Mr. Naegel (proprietor of the White
Lunch on 8th Avenue) and soldiers allegedly
involved in the attack testified before the panel
regarding the attacks on the restaurants. Another
43 witnesses appeared to offer testimony on the
Riverside riot. 37
The enlisted ranks and NCOs who gave
testimony before the courts made it difficult to
attribute specific blame for the riots. Members
of the local battalions were generally unwilling
to implicate their comrades, 38 and most of the
soldiers in the raids had ripped off their
regimental shoulder badges. 39 Rumours about
the White Lunch and Riverside had apparently
circulated before the nights' events, but the vast
majority testified that the raids were spontaneous
acts with no particular leaders. 40 Most pleaded
that they only learned of the attacks once they
had started. They testified that they were simply

told to "fall in" as trained and they did, often
unaware of where they were heading- and that
they were at the scenes only due to idle curiosity.
When their memories failed them as to their
whereabouts or alleged activities, several turned
to drunkenness as an excuse. 41
Both military and civilian officials were more
pointed in their testimony, but they also tended
to blame each other. Military officers who testified
were not reluctant to name and incriminate
soldiers they saw at the riots, but they also tended
to stress the role of civilians in the raids. Civil
authorities, however, blamed the soldiers almost
universally. Numerous "ordinary soldiers"
insisted that the attacks were actually started by
civilians "of a lawless sort" who were then joined
by some men in uniform. 42
In the end, the court of inquiry yielded
inconclusive evidence. In the post-inquiry report
to the Militia Council on the Calgary
disturbances, Cruikshank reflected that:
Every possible effort has been made by these
Courts to procure evidence against all persons
implicated in these disturbances. Their
exertions in this respect have not been attended
with as much success as was desired. All
soldiers against whom there was any evidence
of having participated in these attacks were then
taken into custody and handed over to the Civil
authorities for trial.

Thirteen soldiers were tried in civilian court and
five convicted, with minimum charges and
sentences laid. Another two were discharged from
the military. 43 As for the cause of the riotous
behaviour, Cruikshank did not believe that the
military was responsible. The GOC was "very
strongly of the opinion that these disturbances
were largely due to inflammatory letters and
articles which appeared in certain newspapers,
and the injudicious remarks made by civilians. "44
As a result, the Adjutant-General did not feel that
any further action was necessary on the part of
the military authorities.
The Chief of Police was critical of the local
military officials who, he felt, were guilty of
inaction and were responsible for the damage to
the Riverside Hotel, if not the White Lunch
restaurants. 45 Commissioned officers belonging
to the same battalions as the men destroying the
local properties made no effort to stop them.

38
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Pt80
Soldiers from the 50th Battalion marching through the streets of Calgary.

Furthermore, it was "common talk amongst the
citizens and the soldiers who took part in the
rioting or were then in camp" that Cruikshank
bore at least partial responsibility. Had the
General taken ordinary preventative measures
and "asserted his authority in a more vigorous
manner," the attack on the Riverside would never
have taken place. Chief Cuddy's sympathy was
with the owner of the hotel, not the military
authorities who had tried to maintain order.
"Through no fault of his own and as a result of
the failure of the military authorities to control
the situation," the Chief reasoned, "Mr. Ebsworth
[the owner of the Riverside Hotel] lost everything
he owned." Since it was impossible to get any
compensation from the men convicted by the
Police Court, Cuddy pleaded that "purely as a
matter of equity, it would seem only fair and
reasonable that the [Federal] Government should
make some compensation" to the owner who had
lost "the entire fruits of almost twenty years effort
in this country" due to matters completely beyond
his control. 46
What was "fair and reasonable" to the City
was not palatable to the military. In the aftermath
of the riots, various Calgary lawyers wrote to the
Minister of the Militia and Defence to seek
damages for the White Lunch Cafe and Riverside
Hotel. Mr. Ebsworth claimed losses and damages
totalling nearly $9,000.00 as a result of the raid,
and the lessee of the hotel claimed another
$6635.00 in damagesY The Judge Advocate

General, however, decided in April 1916 that
given the results of the inquiry "into the alleged
riot" the Department was not liable for damages.
"The Government is in no way responsible for
the wrong-doing of its soldiers" he concluded. 48
When a law firm acting on behalf of White Lunch
Limited requested compensation, a more
substantive defence was issued:
The evidence shows that the destruction
complained of was done by a mob composed
for the greater part of men in military uniform,
with some civilians. The men in uniform,
however, were not there as soldiers, were not
under orders or on duty as a military body, were
not acting as servants or agents of the Crown,
but proceeded merely as individual citizens
subject to the Criminal Law of the land, and
amenable to civil tribunals .... It must then be
plain to you, as it is to the Officials of this
Department, that much as the outrage in
question is to be deplored, much as your clients
are entitled to sympathy, and much as the rioters
are deserving of the severest punishment, yet
the public as represented by the Government at
Ottawa are not answerable for the depredations
in question. 49

The owners of the three establishments destroyed
during the riots of February 1916 continued to
press for compensation, but the defence
department stuck to this position. The Crown
had legal immunity, but its moral position was
less certain. An American lawyer writing on behalf
of the owners of the White Lunch made the case
39
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that his claimants were obviously "innocent
victims of popular excitement brought about by
the great war and working through a force of
soldiery only partially disciplined which got out
of hand and with which the local police proved
entirely unable to cope." In the United States,
even in cases where blame was much less
transparent that this, the government had
"repeatedly made compensation as a matter of
grace irrespective of the question of legal
liability. "50

military discipline and misadministration on a
local level. That very few soldiers were punished
for the riots (a mere seven out of the more than
1,000 estimated to be involved) made the episode
all the more disconcerting. Later courts of inquiry
were rich in descriptions of what occurred, but
barren in evidence that identified the mob
leaders. The men who composed the mob may
have been in khaki uniforms, but when engaged
in rioting, the military refused to consider them
soldiers.

The military never paid compensation for
damages, although its justification is
questionable in light of other cases. In October
1916, a few hundred civilians and soldiers
attacked the Royal Northwest Mounted Police
(RNWMP) Barracks in Calgary to demand the
release of five soldiers who had been arrested
for violating the liquor act. A subsequent court
of enquiry heard evidence similar to that offered
during the February hearings. Several individual
soldiers were charged, fined and discharged, and
the Department of Militia and Defence paid for
the damage done to the RNWMP barracks and
for personal items that were damaged or stolen. 51
The Judge Advocate General never saw fit to
comment on why this compensation should be
paid, perhaps because the amount was
significantly less than that demanded by the
owners of the White Lunch and Riverside.
Furthermore, compassionate grants were made
in England following the riots of Canadian troops
at Witley Camp in 1919 that seemed to resemble
the Calgary claims. 5 2 However, the Department
recognized that the compensation question
extended beyond the Calgary incident. If
compensation was paid to Mr. Ebsworth, the JAG
argued, "it would open up a similar question in
the numerous other cases where, riots having
occurred, compensation from the Crown was
requested and payment of the same has been
refused. I refer particularly to the riots in Quebec
in 1918. "53 Mr. Ebsworth, who was ruined by the
attack, continued to seek restitution well into the
Second World War, but his effort was ultimately
in vain.

By blaming civil society and anti-German
rhetoric for the riotous behaviour, and refusing
to take meaningful responsibility for what had
transpired, military officials ignored their role
and responsibility for the damage. Although
recruited to serve the causes of peace and justice,
over-zealous and misguided Canadian soldiers
threatened the security of a community in the
very country they had pledged their lives to
defend. The real victims were not members of
Calgary society threatened by the continued
presence of "enemy aliens," but individual
citizens, the owners of the White Lunch Company,
the Dance Academy, and the Riverside Hotel.

The drudgery of life for the citizen-soldiers
stationed in Calgary, and the swirling tempest of
anti-alien prejudice in early 1916, set the context
for the riots. The attacks were prompted by
nativist ideas, but they were also products of poor
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